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ABSTRACT: Those over sixty years of age accounted for 6.6% of the total popu-
lation of Brazil in 1985, in the Federal Republic of Germany this proportion was 20.3%
in 1984. As early as 1950 it had been 14.5%. This proportion will not even be reached
in Brazil in the year 2000 when persons aged sixty years and older are only projected
to make up 8.8% of the total population. Similarly, in 1982/84 life expectancy at birth
in the Federal Republic was 70.8 years for men and 77.5 for women; in Brazil the figures
for 1980/85 were, by contrast, "only" 61.0 and 66.0. Against this background it is easy
to understand why the discussion concerning an ageing society with its many related
medical, economic, individual and social problems has been so slow in coming into its
own in Brazil. As important as a more intensive consideration of these aspects may be
in Brazil at present, they are, nevertheless, only one side of the story. For a European
historical demographer with a long-term perspective of three of four hundred years,
the other side of the story is just as important. The life expectancy which is almost ten
years lower in Brazil is not a result of the fact that no one in Brazil lives to old age.
In 1981 people sixty-five years and older accounted for 34.4% of all deaths! At the
same time infants accounted for only 22.1% of total mortality. They are responsible, along
with the "premature" deaths among youths and adults, for the low, "average" life expec-
tancy figure. In Europe, by contrast, these "premature" deaths no longer play much of a
role. In 1982/84 more than half of the women (52.8%) in the Federal Republic of
Germany lived to see their eightieth birthdays and almost half of the men (47.3%) lived
to see their seventy-fifth. Our biological existence is guaranteed to an extent today that
would have been unthinkable a few generations ago. Then, the classic troika of "plague,
hunger and war" threatened our forefathers all the time and everywhere. The radical
transition from the formerly uncertain to a present-day certain lifetime, which is the result
of the repression of "plague, hunger and war", led to unexpected consequences for our
living together. Our forefathers were forced to live in closely knit Gemeinschaften in the
interest of physical survival and to subordinate their egoistic goals to a common value,
but now these pressures have, for the most part, fallen away. Correspondingly, this much
more certain EGO has taken center stage. An ever greater number of us chooses to live
life as single beings: the number of marriages is lower every year; the number of divorces
is on the increase; in Berlin (West) more than half (sic! 52.3%) of all households are
already composed on only one person. For the last dozen years the annual number of
births in the Federal Republic has been insufficient to ensure population replacement.
Not a population explosion but rather the opposite, a population implosion, is our
problem. Human beings do not appear to be "social animals", as was axiomatically assumed
for so long. They were only forced to behave as such for as long as "plague, hunger and
war" forced them to do so. When these life endangering conditions no longer exist and
life becomes certain even without their being integrated into a Gemeinschaft then humans
suddenly show themselves more and more to be independent single beings. It is not the
percentage of the population that is over sixty or sixty-five that is decisive in this context
but rather how certain adults perceive their biological lives to be, since they are the
ones who organize their lives, who build communities or who are ever more often willing
only to enter into means-to-an-end personal unions without lasting or close ties and
mutual responsibilities. There are many signs which seem to point to a development in this
direction in Brazil as well. More and more adults in Brazil are caught up in the deep-seated
transition from an uncertain to a certain lifetime. A third of them die after having
reached their sixty-fifth birthday. It therefore seems to me to be high time that one began
to give more consideration to the other side of the story in Brazil as well. And who is more
suited intensively to consider the long-term perspectives than those engaged in the public
health sector in whose competence, after all, such aspects, as "life certainty", "life expec-
tancy" and "age at death" belong?
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INTRODUCTION
During a first guest professorship for post-
graduate studies in historical demography at
the "Universidade Federal do Paraná" (UFPR)
in "Curitiba" Brazil and at the "Pontifícia
Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul"
(PUCRS) in "Porto Alegre", Brazil, in 1984
I concentrated on the topic of "Mortality
Problems in Brazil and Germany: Past-present-
future. Learning from each other?" (Imhof19).
During a second such professorship at the
same universities in 1986, with new groups
of post-graduate students, discussion centered
on the topic "Possible consequences of increas-
ed life expectancy in Brazi 1 — from t he
perspecive of a European historical demo-
grapher". It could not, of course, be my task
in this context to teach Brazilians what they
already know better and are able to judge
more appropriately than a European coming
from abroad (Mundigo30, 1986, Fundação
SEADE35, 1982).
By the same token it is not the intention
of this paper to discuss e.g. the economic
implications of an aging Brazilian society, nor
the resulting necessity of more homes for the
aged or more geriatric stations for long-term
chronically ill patients. Even though the lit-
erature on this topic is not as extensive as in
Europe, where we have known these problems
for a longer period of time, there is a discussion
in progress in Brazil, debates are conducted
in daily newspapers, conferences and con-
gresses are held, training courses in geriatrics
and gerontology are arranged and scientific
studies are published (Boemer3, 1986, Born4,
1986, Folha de São Paulo18, 1986, Gaiarsa14,
1986, Gazeta do Povo1,26, 1986, Haddad17, 1986,
LBA12,13, 1986 and Leite*, 1986, Mabilde23,
1985, Macedo24, 1983, Magalhães25, 1982, Net-
to30,31, 1985, Netto e col.**, 1983, Prefeitura
Municipal de Curitiba32, 1986, Queiroz33,34,
1986, Salgado36,37, 1982. These few references
should be enough to prove that Brazilians
have obviously not been waiting for us to
come and make them aware of the topic
of an ageing society and the multitude of
problems related to it.
I would much prefer to concentrate on that
which I was repeatedly asked, not only by
historical demographers but also when speak-
ing to gerontologists, sociologists, psycholo-
gists, politicians, physicians and others em-
ployed in the public health system. They all
wanted a European historian to outline some
of the longterm perspectives in relation to an
increasing life-expectancy on the basis of his
European experience, on the one hand, and
to try to interpret the current tendencies and
developments in Brazil against this back-
ground, on the other.
Even though I will try to perform this
delicate task in the following, it is, of course,
up to every Brazilian to accept my conside-
rations, or to modify or to reject them. The
proffered term "tendencies" helps me to
overlook some of my own reservations: Reser-
vations with regard to the sources, por example,
in the face of the well-known fact that vital
statistics are underregistered and the conse-
quently reduced reliability of the "hard facts",
on which I, nevertheless, have to base my
arguments (Laurenti and col.21, 1985: 50-56,
70-73; Mello Jorge27, 1983).
Comparing current "tendencies" in Brazil
with historical "tendencies" in Europe saves
us from the misleading assumption that we
are dealing with "parallels" here, with auto-
matisms, with accurately predictable or even
calculable developments that are only taking
place in Brazil with a time delay of a few
decades, but which principally will proceed,
or even have to proceed according to the
European pattern. A certain probability exists
in this context. But it does not have to develop
in this direction and certainly not with cal-
culable regularity. Brazil is not Europe and the
Brazilians of "Norte, Nordeste, Sudeste, Sul"
or "Centro-Oeste" are not the Europeans of
Central Europe which populate the horizon
of my experience. In short: it is not my main
intention to teach historically derived dogma,
much less to discuss decimal points, but rather
to go beyond the decimal points and to provide
food for thought.
The Facts in Brazil
According to figures from the Brazilian
Statistical Bureau (Fundação IBGE10), infant
mortality in 1975/80 was 78.77 per one
thousand live births, the life expectancy at
birth was 59.54 years for men and 64.25 for
women (Figure 1, top). In the Federal Re-
"A Previdência Social e a Aposentadoria no Brasil", manuscript prepared by C. B. Leite, based on
the Round-Table held in the "Curso de Formação em Gerontologia Social" ministered by the In-
ternational Center of Social Gerontology, Rio de Janeiro, July, 7th to 18th, 1986.
Report presented by A. J. Netto and colaborators, on the present situation of the program for the
elderly in 1983.

public of Germany the infant mortality rate
in 1980 was 12.7 and the life expectancy
1982/84 was 70.84 and 77.47 years for men
and women respectively (Statistisches Bun-
desamt40, 1986: 70, 76). Brazil will still not
have caught with to us in the five year period
2020/25 if the figure for infant mortality
there is 29.80 per thousand and life expectancy
69.05 and 75.26 years. These are not my
projections and, therefore, not my idea of what
I, a foreigner, might consider desirous. On the
contrary, they are the goals projected by an
official Brazilian bureau and published in the
Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1985 (Fundação
IBGE10, 1986: 127). Apparently this deve-
lopment is considered desirous and attainable
in the country itself. I simply take them into
consideration in the following.
Against this background it is easier to
understand why, in Brazil, one so often hears
that the infant mortality is much "too high"
and the life expectancy is much "too low".
That too many life years are lost through
diseases that could have been avoided. If we
compare recent statistics from both countries
with each other, those for Brazil from the
year 1982 and those for the Federal Republic
of Germany for 1985, the picture that presents
itself is highly differentiated. In Brazil 448
people died of diphtheria (032, ICD-9), in the
Federal Republic 0. For whooping cough (033)
the ratio was 391 to 5. For tetanus (037) 713
to 6, for measles (055) 1670 to 5, for malaria
(084) 578 to 22, and for symptoms, signs and
ill-defined conditions of the digestive system
(009) a surprising 32,049 to 185 (Ministério
da Saúde28, 1985: 326-327; Statistisches Bun-
desamt 198641: 5-9). Even the plague (020)
has not been fully eliminated in Brazil. In
1982 151 cases were reported none of which,
however, ended in death (Fundação IBGE10,
1986: 199).
If, in addition, the relatively small pro-
portion of elderly people in Brazil is consi-
dered (Figure 1, bottom), then it becomes
quite clear why Brazilians consider infant
mortality "too high", life expectancy "too low"
and "unnecessarily forfeited life years" still
seem more important than the problems of an
ageing population at the other end of the
spectrum. Indeed, Brazilians between the ages
of sixty and sixty-nine accounted for only
4.0% of the population, those seventy years
and older for only 2.6%, altogether those aged
sixty and older made up only 6.6% of the
population (IBGE10 1986, 61). In the Federal
Republic, on the other hand, this group repre-
sented 20.3% of the population in 1984. As
early as 1950 the figure in the Federal Re-
public was as high as 14.5% (Statistisches
Bundesamt40, 1986: 62). This figure will not
even be attained in Brazil in the year 2000
when the proportion is projected to be 8.0%.
A superficial consideration of all these
data can easily lead one to the conclusion that
the "aged" and their problems do not carry
any real weight in Brazil and merely represent
a negligible fringe group at the upper end of
the population pyramid. At the bases of this
pyramid there is, at present, much to be done
and one must, therefore, continue to concen-
trate primarily on the fastest possible reduction
in infant and child mortality as well as the
avoidable mortality of people at prime ages.
I do not want to deny for a minute that
all these aspects are really still very important
in Brazil, in any case more important than
they are in Europe. If one makes low infant
mortality and high life expectancy in Europe,
or anywhere else in the First World, a cri-
terion — as is done in Brazil and in other
countries in the Second, Third and Fourth
Worlds and as was expressed in the goals set
by the Brazilian Statistical Bureau it can,
however, easily lead those countries into a
dilemma. They want to "catch up" as fast as
possible and to at least come close to the
"better" figures found in the First World. It
seems to me that such a comparative approach
is inclined to mask or to excessively repress
other important facts.
On the basis of his scientific knowledge
the European historical demographer is in-
clined to cast a critical eye on another deve-
lopment which is just as clearly expressed in
the Brazilian figures, if one is willing to
recognize it. For this purpose I will repeat a
simple experiment that I made with my post-
graduate students in Curitiba in order to give
them something to think about. In Table 1
the burial lists from a German and a Brazilian
city of comparable size from a randomly
chosen day in 1986 appear side by side. The
German city is Munich (1985: 1,266,100
inhabitants; Statistisches Bundesamt40, 1986:
59), the Brazilian city is Curitiba (1984:
1,227,322 inhabitants; "Departamento Esta-
dual de Estatística"5, 1986: 53).
Although the number of cases for Munich
and Curitiba, with 24 and 18 deaths respec-
tively, are relatively small, the life expectancy
calculated on the basis of these samples corres-
ponds closely to the current life expectancy
in both countries (in 1982/84 men in the Fede-
ral Republic could count on 70.8 and women
77.5 years, of life, in Brazil the figures for
1980/86 were 61.0 and 66.0 for men and wo-
men respectively). That means we currently
have about seventy-five years to live in Central
Europe; and the Brazilians about sixty-five.
This roughly ten year shorter life expectancy
is not, however, a result of the fact that no
one in Brazil ever lives to an old or even very
old age. Pedro in Curitiba lived to be ninety
just as Ida in Munich did; Francisco even
lived to be ninety-two exceeding all of the
cases reported for Munich. To the same extent,
cases of people dying in their eighties are
neither seldom in the one nor the other city.
Yet what one also finds in Brazil — and this
accounts for the greatest difference from Euro-
pe — are the massive number of deaths of chil-
dren, adolescents and young adults (Márcio:
nine years old; René: fifteen years old; Ma-
riza: twenty-one years old), not to mention
the burials of infants and small children
which are obviously not reported in Curitiba.
They are the major factor in sinking the
"average age at death" and, therefore, the
"average life expectancy" in Brazil.
One must avoid being mislead by the po-
pulation pyramid with its relatively small
proportion of aged and the low average life
expectancy, but should instead contrast the
share of infant mortality with the share of
mortality among the aged, then it becomes
immediately clear that in Brazil there is not
only still a high rate of infant mortality but
that mortality among the aged also plays a
major role. Indeed that it is already higher.
In 1981 deaths under one year of age ac-
counted for 22.1% of all mortality while
those over sixty-five years of age accounted
for 34.4%! Every tenth burial was, according
to official statistics, of a person over eighty
years of age (11.2%).
It is not my purpose here to enter into a
long debate concerning the quality of the
sources, for example how high the under-
registration of infant mortality, which is doub-
tless a factor, might be. The mortality pattern
among adults is more important for my argu-
mentation. And this is what is expressed in
Table 1, with the complete exclusion of the
mortality of infants and small children. Mor-
tality among adults, and not among infants
and small children, primarily determines how
certain life appears to people who are con-
sciously engaged in making life plans and
setting concrete goals for themselves which
an historian can later attempt to determine.
Figure 2, along with Table 1, does not let any
doubt arise that adult life has also become
relatively certain in Brazil. More than half of
all males (50.2%) lived to be 65 years old
as early as 1975, for women this figure was
almost two-thirds (64.7%) (Fundação IBGE10,
1986: 125). In the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, by comparison, the figures for 1970/72
were 68.5% for men and 81.4% for women
(Statistisches Bundesamt40, 1986: 76). We have
to return to the period between the two World
Wars in Germany in order to find conditions
similar to those which exist in Brazil today:
for men back to 1924/26 (52.7%) and for
women back to 1932/34 (63.7%) (Statis-
tisches Bundesamt40, 1986: 76).
In the meantime our lives have become
biologically so certain in Central Europe that,
in 1982/84, more than half of all women
(52.8%) saw their eightieth and almost half
of all men (47.3%) saw at least their se-
venty-fifth birthdays. We are fully aware of
this high degree of security which would have
been unthinkable a few generations ago. The
relatively few who die earlier, primarily be-
cause of accidents and suicide, do not impair
our feeling of greater biological certainty.
Many already believe that they have a right
to a life of seventy-five or eighty years. If
someome dies earlier then the obituary ac-
cusingly asks: "Why so early?"
What is, however, also expressed in Figure
2 is the fact that there are major regional
differences within Brazil. This can be seen
again in Figure 3. In order to demonstrate
the relationship and interdependence of pop-
ulation structure, mortality distribution and
causes of death to my post-graduate students,
the appropriate data for every Brazilian state
were collected in a common effort, analyzed
and presented graphically. Figure 3 contains a
summary of this work on a superordinate level
for the five major regions in Brazil. In the
center of the figure the analog segmentai
representations of the respective parts of Bra-
zil and the Federal Republic are shown.
I hardly need to explain the details in a
Brazilian journal of public health. For easily
recognized reasons a population pyramid with
a wide base rapidly becoming narrower to-
wards the top correlates with a mortality
pattern in which there is a high percentage
of infant mortality and a relatively wide dis-
tribution of mortality in every other age
category (the type found in "Norte" and
"Nordeste"). These two presentations, in turn,
correspond with a mortality distribution in
which a high percentage of infectious and
parasitic diseases but also symptoms, signs
and ill-defined conditions are found (again
"Norte" and "Nordeste").
The narrower the base of the pyramid the
more mortality is shifted from the youngest
to an ever older group (the type found in "Sul"
and "Sudeste"), and the higher the proportion
in the category II (neoplasms) and VII (di-
seases of the circulatory system) (again "Sul"
and "Sudeste"). This phenomenon is even
more obvious in the Federal Republic of
Germany today than is the case for the
southernmost states in Brazil. Here one finds
a reversal in the former ratios and proportions;
20.4% of the population in the Federal Re-
public is over sixty years of age (in Brazil,
5.9%, in Rio Grande do Sul, 7.1%); 77.3%
of all deaths occur at an age over sixty-five
(Brazil 34.4%, Rio Grande do Sul, 44.0%).
And 74.3% of all causes of death are based,
in the Federal Republic, on neoplasms and
diseases of the circulatory system (Brazil,
34.6%, Rio Grande do Sul, 50.2%).
From this complex I would like to isolate
two points for further consideration. Firstly
what we see here is the basic transition from
the "old" to the "new" form of dying. The
further the epidemiological transition has pro-
ceeded in a population, the fewer people die
of "avoidable" traditional infectious and para-
sitic diseases and the greater the proportion
that dies of cancer and diseases of the heart
and circulatory systems. It is not only the
distribution of mortality that undergoes a
process of change in this context but also the
"quality" of dying. Infectious and parasitic
diseases may occur at every age, but most of
them kill relatively rapidly. It is a quick and
gracious death. Chronic conditions do, of
course, let us live longe, but they often lead
to a long process of dying. Death lets us wait
for him. He tortures us often for weeks,
months and years before finally taking pity
and releasing us. This is what many of us in
the First World fear: suffering without end
with continually increasing dependency on our


environment, a drawn out physical and psychic
struggle with death in a no win situation.
Secondly it is a fact that the Brazilian states
in the "Sudeste" region, particularly "Sul",
have come the furthest in terms of this de-
velopment. The segmentai representations of
the population structure, mortality distribution
and causes of death always tend to look the
most "European" (for S. Paulo cf. Laurenti e
Lolio21, 1986). Even if one allows for a large
margin of error in these statistics, it is still
possible to maintain the principle conclusion
to which they lead us. This indicates that the
southernmost states have come the furthest on
the path from the "old" to the "new" prob-
lems: less mortality among infants and small
children, therefore more mortality among the
aged; less infectious and parasitic disease,
therefore more chronic conditions as the cause
of death. This was decisive in my making the
decision to accept a UFPR and PUCRS guest
professorship in southern Brazil. Just as I see
myself, coming from Europe where the entire
problem reversal has progressed much further,
as having a responsibility to point out problems
which are likely to be of great importance in
Brazil in the near future, I also see southern
Brazil as having a special responsibility in
relation to the rest of the country. The nor-
thern, north-western and central-western re-
gions are likely to follow the southernmost
region in this problem reversal a few gene-
rations later. To make a generation of young
academics at universities in the southern states
Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná aware of this
development, and to have them reflect upon
it today, was the goal and purpose of a post-
graduate course on "extended lifetimes" in
Curitiba and Porto Alegre.
Long-term Perspectives and Theoretical
Framework of a European Historian
Figure 4 summarizes in a very simplified
and schematic form my own research during,
roughly, the last twelve years and the theory
I have derived from it. In this period I have
been able, with a number of research teams,
to perform computer analyses of data on the
birth, marriage, migration and death of tens
of thousands of persons from parish registers
from all over Germany. Although isolated
parish registers go back to the sixteenth cen-
tury, uninterrupted soucre material for large
areas is only available for the last 300 hundred
years, All the segmental figures on the left are
related to this earlier period, that is around
1680, those on the right are for "today",
symbolized by the year 1980.
The individual lines in both graphical seg-
ments at the top represent life courses "earlier"
and "today". Since only adults, as was men-
tioned earlier, actively confront the problem
of adopting a life plan, a goal in life and
with that deciding what form their lives are
to take, I have chosen to consider only persons
who survived at least until their twenty-fifth
birthdays, Three hundred years ago that was
about half of every birth cohort in Europe. On
the left there is greater discrepancy in the indi-
vidual life course lines and there are, therefore,
a larger number of gaps. On the right, by
contrast, only one of these lines is missing.
Most people live until their twenty-fifth
birthdays today (for men 1982/84 the figure
was 97.2%, for women 98.3%; Statistisches
Bundesamt40, 1986: 76).
Yet even those who "earlier" survived the
dangerous infant and early childhood years
and lived to become adults were not as sure
of the rest of their lives. One died at age
thirty-five during a typhus epidemic, a mother
of twenty-eight in chidbirth, and another at
age fifty of the plague. Others, however, sur-
vived all of these dangers and lived to be
eighty-five or ninety years old. Life, even adult
life, was uncertain. "In the middle of our lives
/ death is all around us" was a common saying
in those days. In the meantime, life has be-
come more certain for the young as well as for
the old, certain to an incomparable extent.
Three-quarters of all twenty-five year-old men
today live to be sixty-five (75.8%), for women
the figure is as high as nine-tenths (87.6%;
Statistisches Bundesamt40, 1986: 76). Only a
few die "prematurely".
The two segmental figures in the middle
illustrate the cause of this deep-seated change.
Our forefathers prayed the All Souls Litany
"Lord preserve us from plague, hunger and
war!", which was an appropriate expression
of the helplessness in the face of the omni-
present danger of the deadly troika with which
they were confronted "Plague" meant all forms
of "pestilence", i.e. epidemic infectious dis-
eases (plague, typhus, typhoid fever, smallpox,
malaria, and in the nineteenth century cholera
asiatica, etc.). "Hunger" was related to the
catastrophic effects which recurrent bad har-
vests had on people and animals. "Wars" did
not lead to the death of a great number of
people as a result of direct military activity,
since armies were relatively small. The great-
est number of people died as a result of in-
direct causes, the tremendous damage caused
by war: the frequent marches through a
territory, the obligation to quarter soldiers and
the comandeering of food. The troops also
tended to spread infectious diseases along with
them, particularly typhus which was trans-
mitted by the lice likely to be found in dirty
uniforms.
The methods our forefathers had for de-
fending themselves against "plague, hunger
and war" were quite imperfect and could not
provide an entire population with effective
protection. Quarantines were often subverted
for economic reasons. The few grain reserves
that existed were intended for use by the mili-
tary. Fleeing from "plague, hunger and war"
and settling in another location for an adequate
period of time was only possible for a very
few wealthy individuals. On the whole, it was
not particularly difficult for the deadly arrows
of the troika to penetrate this imperfect line
of defence striking individuals at any place
and at any time.
Today, on the other hand, these arrows
have become dull or need a much longer time
in order to penetrate the much more effective
belt of protection which surrounds us, every-
one of us. A correspondingly low number
of people die "prematurely". On the contrary,
ever more people are able to live out an ever
greater part of the life span which nature
intended for human beings. The average age
of death has risen so far and the individual
age at death has become so standardized that
most of us today can count on living seventy
or eighty years.
Of course we know, particularly the histo-
rian knows, that our present situation is fra-
gile. It is true that at the moment we have,
and have had for the last three or four decades
in Europe, neither notable "pestilences", nor
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hunger nor war. That does not, however, mean
that this situation is guaranteed for the future.
We have to actively contribute to this oursel-
ves. Yet quite a few Europeans, not the least
of which are to be found among the young,
are subject in the meantime to a diffuse Angst
(anxiety) where our forefathers dealt with a
concrete fear of "plague, hunger and war":
Angst in relation to new infectious diseases
(AIDS!), Angst in relation to poison in our
food and the destruction of our environment
by pesticides, insecticides, herbicides, forms of
energy production which are no longer under
control, Angst in relation to an arms race that
could end in a catastrophe. Dealing with this
diffuse sort of Angst is much more difficult
than coming to terms with concrete fear. We
by no means live in paradise, even if we no
longer have the old problems of "plague,
hunger and war". The new ones are not
smaller or easier to solve. — How did our
forefathers come to terms with their problems?
Above all, how did they come to terms with
the big problem of the permanent uncertainty
of their lives? The lower segmental figures
give an answer to these questions.
Since our forefathers were also not able to
do without stability in life, and their own
lives were just as uncertain as every other,
they drew their consequences and did not place
any given individual at the center of their
thoughts and actions, not even their own
EGOs. The center of their world and their
Weltanschauung was a value which offered
greater stability over a longer period of time.
The EGO put itself at the service of this value
for the shorter or longer period of time that
it was allowed to spend on earth. The center
of stability was therefore surrounded by many
EGOs with life lines of very different lengths.
In actual practice, this center of stability could
take on very different forms. In agricultural
societies, in which almost all of our fore-
fathers found themselves, the farm played an
important role, its unimpaired reputation, its
prestige and its welfare. It was the superor-
dinate value which was handed down from
generation to generation and in the service of
which everyone who lived there placed their
lives for as long as they lasted. Everyone be-
longed to a farm Gemeinschaft, which could
not eliminate the uncertainty of individual life
spans, but which could mitigate it. Under
urban conditions a guild could have been this
sort of Gemeinschaft and the center of stabi-
lity could have been a knowledge of trade
secrets. Or one could imagine an artist's circle
or the inhabitants of a convent as this sort of
Gemeinschaft, whose members each in their
own way orientated their thinking and beha-
vior around a certain central thought, a supe-
rordinated, endurable — in accordance with
their own ideas immortal — value. Becoming
part of such a Gemeinschaft which served a
system of superordinate values, to integrate or
subordinate oneself within it was necessary
at that time for physical survival.
In the meantime these permanent elements
of uncertainty "plague, hunger and war" have,
for the most part, disappeared from the Euro-
pean scene and the presure to live in close-
knit Gemeinschaften has been reduced. We
no longer need those "bad old communities",
with their tight restraints upon the individual,
in order to survive physically. The many years
we have on earth are guaranteed to us withuot
them. We have therefore liberated ourselves
more and more from these cumbersome bonds.
They only seemed to restrict our individual
freedom in an obsolete manner. To an ever
greater extent we place our more certain
EGO at the center of our thoughts and actions
and seem, to ourselves, to be the center of
the world. Our life's goal is self-realization
and not the welfare of a superordinate com-
mon purpose. The numerous EGOs now live
in a relatively impersonal Gesellschaft, in
loose ad hoc personal unions with varying
participation in this or that interest group,
existing alongside each other without having
any real relationships to one another (the
terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft with
exactly these meanings were coined by the
German sociologist Ferdnand Tönnies (1855-
1936); (Tönnies44, 1887/1972),
Realizing our full potential is all the easier
since most of us are able to afford to make
use of the widely available range of goods
and services which society offers. The middle
class has become very large in Europe. Social
services tend to negate the differences be-
tween the rich and the poor. Women receive
an education equivalent to that of men. In
addition to the formerly available roles of
only-housewives or mothers they find real al-
ternatives. It seems more and more that hu-
man beings are indeed not the "social animals"
which they were considered to be up until a
short time ago. They only behaved as such for
as long as they were forced to by the unfor-
tunate conditions of "plague, hunger and war".
As soon as these existential threats began to
be diminished they began to show themselves
more and more as independent single beings.
In Table 2 I have collected some data for the
Federal Republic of Germany which impressi-
vely document this development during the
last two or three decades.
At the very top one sees again how the
certainty of our life spans has increased even
further and how the proportion of people over
sixty-five has also continued to increase. The
decrease in the number of marriages and the
increase in the number of divorces is just as
clear. The divorced wait longer and longer
before re-marrying, if indeed they to at all.
During the same period of time the number of
births sank, whether as a result of the lower
number of children per family or as a result
of the numerous marriages in which no children
were born. The result is that the mean house-
hold size has continually become smaller. Parti-
cularly the number of one-person households
has increased. In 1960 every fifth household
was composed of one person (20.6%), by 1970
it was every fourth (25.1%) and in 1982 every
third (31.3%). In large cities conditions are
even more extreme. In Hamburg 40.6% of all
households were composed of only one person
in 1982, in Berlin (West) the corresponding fi-
gure was 52.3%. More than half of all hou-
seholds in Berlin (West) are one-person hou-
seholds, whether as a result of divorce or the
death of a spouse, or because the inhabitants
have either not yet married or will never
marry.
Single persons are, in principle, infertile.
For years the number of births in the Federal
Republic has been insufficient to make up for
the number of deaths. The population has
been declining. We are faced not with a po-
pulation explosion but with a population im-
plosion; not the propagation of birth control
but just the opposite, the encouragement of
more births — in case that is what we really
want. Politicians, particularly those respon-
sible for the family, seem to want this. The
long-term historical perspective, as I have just
shown, might serve to teach us that their ad
hoc measures, which usually only amount to
financial manipulation, are not far-reaching
enough to be able to put a stop to — let
alone reverse — a trend towards living as
single beings which has been underway for
such a long time. All the figures presented
seem to indicate that we are less and less
willing to enter into long-term ties and respon-
sibilities, whether with a partner or with a
child. The increasing number of "group living
arrangements" or of "marriages without a li-
cense" do not refute these findings. In these
cases we are by no means dealing with Ge-
meinschaften of the traditional type described
above. They are not a consequence of survival
strategies, but rather also serve the purpose of
more self-realization, more personal enjoyment,
more personal satisfaction.
Hence, the politicians' appeals for "more
family", "back to the family" and "more
children" will only find resonance among a
very few of our contemporaries. It will not be
possible to influence the trend towards life
as single beings in the long run by means of
simple financial motivation or tax disadvan-
tages. Only very few convinced single men
or women are likely to establish a family and
have children only because one-person house-
holds might be threatened with higher taxes.
It is just as unlikely that very many women
will be willing to have more children, or to
have children at all, because more numerous
day care centers and an additional vacation
year are promised. This deep-seated change
from an uncertain to a certain life span which
has taken place over the course of the last
three centuries has freed the individual from
the centuries-old pressure to build Gemein-
schaften and has set him free in a way that
can not be reversed by superficial administra-
tive measures.
The Brazilian Facts Within this Framework
I have described the deep-seated change
from an uncertain to a certain lifetime in such
detail and outlined the effects it has on our
living together so drastically in order to en-
courage Brazilians, who seem to be moving in
the same direction, to start thinking about it
now. In case they want to try and influence
this development which is becoming noticeable
there as well, it is likely to be easier now than
it will be when they have arrived at the same
point were Europe finds itself at present.
Far be it from me to claim that the trend
to a growing number of single beings is only
a result of the increase in life expectancy, that
is a life that has become certain for everyone
and caused the Gemeinschaften which were
formerly necessary for survival to become
superfluous. The continual transfer of tradi-
tional family functions to superordinate institu-
tions (such as kindergartens, public schools,
hospitals, retirement plans, homes for the
aged) played, of course, just as important a
role as the better education of women to the
extent that they more often become fully
qualified for professions, or the existence of a
large middle class, mentioned above. Never-
theless, the transition from an uncertain to a
certain lifetime undoubtedly belongs insepa-
rably and constitutively to this complex and,
therefore, to the area of public health as well,
in the competence of which it for the most
part falls. Table 3 is meant to encourage its
readers in reflecting upon this topic.
It would be presumptuous for me, as a
foreigner, to claim to competently interpret
the statistics. Not only are they related to a
much shorter period of time than those for
the Federal Republic presented in Table 2,
one must also take the fact into consideration
that Brazil is just not the Federal Republic.
Similar tendencies may very well be the result
of different causes. Still, an historian is con-
fronted with a series of factors in Brazil which
have played a role for a longer period of time
in Europe and which rapidly accelerated the
tendency towards single living at an earlier
time there. I think, in this context, of in-
creased urbanization, particularly a growing
over-metropolitanization, in which Tönnies
saw one of the basic elements of the transition
from living together in Gemeinschaften to-
ward living alongside each other in Gesell-
schaften (Tönnies44, 1887/1972; cf. Table 4).
Another important aspect is the growing lite-
racy of the population, particularly the in-
creased ability to read on the part of younger
women (Table 5a and 5b). As a result of this
new worlds are opened to them causing them
to be more independent in many areas of
everyday life (EDUCAR7, 1986, EDUCAR6,
1986, Goody e Watt15, 1975, Graff16, 1981,
Kramer20, 1986). The growing integration of
women into the labor market is part of the
same complex, even when this happens against
their will. With the drying up of the labor
market for men and a simultaneous loss in the
buying power of the "salário mínimo" it seems
that many families see themselves with no
other choice in the matter of women going out
to work (Table 6). Even if they earn only very
little, they still earn their own money. For a
European historian it is hard to imagine that
the increasing rate of general literacy among
Brazilian women and their growing integration
into the labor market with their own sources
of income will not lead to an increasing
awareness of their own value as well, and with
that to growing self-reliance and independence
as was so obvious in Europe in the wake of
increased industrialization and literacy in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Per-
haps higher rates of divorce and separation
documented in Table 3, particularly cases in
which there was no mutual agreement and
where they were sought by the female partners,
are to be seen against this background? Not
to mention the reduction in the number of
births! To give birth to a child or not is, after
all, a woman's decision.
Brazilian readers will undoubtedly be able
to interpret the data collected in Tables 4 to 6
more correctly than I am able to as a foreign
observer (Mundigo29, 1986, Fundação SEADE35,
1982). It was only important to me here to
point up possible tendencies, possible deve-
lopments, possible causes and possible con-
nections. On the basis of my own experience
as a European historian I could not help be
noticing them while I was in Brazil. For this
reason I have placed them in the spotlight
here and would like to vigorously encourage
reflection upon them. This is, in any case,
what I saw as my job in Porto Alegre and
Curitiba. The indicators seem obvious enough
to me that one should confront them, and if
necessary, react to them. Those active in the
field of public health are called upon to a
greater extent than others since their work
is so closely connected to the questions of life
expectancy, epidemiological transition, cer-
tainty of physiological life and age at death.
Even if one is confronted with far more
pragmatic, immediate and concrete problems in
everyday practice, one should now and again
try to rectify what one is doing in the hight of
longterm effects it may have.
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IMHOF, A. E. Possíveis conseqüências da crescente longevidade no Brasil. Perspectiva de
um demógrafo. Rev. Saúde públ., S. Paulo, 21:447-65, 1987.
RESUMO: Em 1985, as pessoas com mais de 60 anos de idade representavam
6,6% da população total do Brasil, enquanto na República Federativa da Alemanha esta
proporção era, em 1984, de 20,3%; em 1950 havia chegado aos 14,5%. Esta proporção
não será alcançada no Brasil, nem mesmo no ano 2000, pois se prevê que as pessoas
acima de 60 anos comporão 8,8% da população total. Da mesma forma, no período
1982/84 a expectativa de vida ao nascer na República Federativa da Alemanha era de
70,8 anos, para homens, e de 77,5, para mulheres. No Brasil, para 1980/85, foi de 61,0
e 66,0, respectivamente. Com este pano de fundo entende-se porque o debate sobre o
envelhecimento da sociedade com os seus múltiplos problemas — médicos, econômicos,
individuais e sociais — tem demorado a assumir qualquer destaque no Brasil. Embora
sejam importantes no Brasil estas considerações, elas constituem, no entanto, presente-
mente, apenas um lado da história. Para um europeu estudioso de demografia histórica
com a vantagem de uma visão de 300 ou 400 anos, o outro lado da história é igual-
mente importante. O fato de a longevidade estar 10 anos mais baixa no Brasil não significa
que ninguém nesse país viva até a idade avançada. Em 1981, pessoas de 65 anos ou mais
representaram 34,4% do total de óbitos; ao mesmo tempo a mortalidade infantil repre-
sentou 22,1% da mortalidade geral. Estas e as mortes "prematuras" entre jovens e adultos
são responsáveis pela baixa cifra da vida média. Na Europa, por outro lado, as mortes
"prematuras" já não desempenham importante papel. Mais da metade das mulheres (52,8%)
da Alemanha sobreviveram até 80 anos de idade, de 1982/84, e quase metade dos homens
(47,3%) sobreviveram até 75 anos. A durabilidade da vida é hoje garantida de tal forma
que teria sido inconcebível há poucas gerações. O tripé clássico de "peste, fome e guerra"
ameaçava os nossos antepassados em todos os lugares e todo tempo. A transição radical
de uma vida anteriormente incerta para a vida segura atual, resultado da repressão daquele
tripé, levou a conseqüências imprevistas para o convívio em comunidade. Nossos ante-
passados eram obrigados a viver em sociedade, bem integrados na busca de sua sobre-
vivência física, e subordinar seus dejetos pessoais aos valores comuns; mas, agora, ao
menos na sua maior parte, estas pressões desapareceram. O ego, com muito mais segu-
rança, passou a ocupar lugar de destaque. Um número crescente de pessoas tem optado
por uma vida solitária: o número de casamentos diminui a cada ano, o número de divór-
cios aumenta; em Berlim Ocidental, mais da metade (52,3%) das "famílias" já se compõe
de uma só pessoa. Durante os últimos 6 anos o número anual de nascimentos foi insufi-
ciente para assegurar a reposição da população. O problema da Alemanha não é de explo-
são demográfica e, sim, de implosão. Os seres humanos já não parecem ser "animais sociais",
como se supunha. Na verdade, a "peste, fome e guerra" os obrigavam a este comporta-
mento. Quando estas condições ameaçadoras se modificaram e a vida se tornou mais
segura, mesmo sem estarem integrados numa sociedade, os seres humanos vêm se tornando
cada vez mais solitários. Não é a existência de população acima de 60 ou 65 anos que
se constituiu um fator decisivo neste contexto, mas, sim, a percepção dos adultos de sua
condição humana, desde que são eles que organizam suas vidas, que constroem comuni-
dades e que com freqüência cada vez maior contraem uniões pessoais como um fim em
si mesmo, sem laços chegados ou duradouros ou responsabilidades mútuas. Uniões estas
que fazem com que as pessoas convivam sem um verdadeiro relacionamento mútuo. Há
vários sinais que parecem indicar tendência nesta direção, também no Brasil. Mais e
mais adultos estão envolvidos nesta profunda transição de uma vida incerta para outra
mais segura. Um terço deles morre depois de ter alcançado seu 65o aniversário. Já é
tempo, pois, de levar em consideração este outro lado da história no Brasil. E quem
melhor para estudar estas perspectivas, a longo prazo, do que aqueles da área da Saúde
Pública, a quem compete, afinal, lidar com aspectos tais como "certeza de vida", expec-
tativa de vida e "idade ao morrer".
UNITERMOS: Transição demográfica. Expectativa de vida. Envelhecimento da popu-
lação, Brasil/Alemanha.
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